

Renesas Synergy™ Platform

Synergy Device Identity Application

Introduction

This application note describes IoT security in general and offers a brief introduction to the security features offered by the Synergy MCU, including different key generation options. The application example in this package uses the Synergy Crypto Engine (SCE) module to generate a unique hardware-based device identity that is securely stored in internal flash using the Security MPU and Flash Access Window (FAW).

This application note enables you to effectively use the Synergy SCE modules in your own design. Upon completion of this guide, you will be able to add the SCE Synergy Software Package (SSP) modules to your own design, configure them correctly for the target application, and write code using the included application example code as a reference and efficient starting point. References to more detailed API descriptions, and other application projects that demonstrate more advanced uses of the module, are in the *Synergy Software Package (SSP) User's Manual*, to serve as a valuable resource in creating more complex designs.

Currently, the Synergy Device Identity Application is implemented and tested on the PK-S5D9/AE-CLOUD2 kit. Support for other Synergy kits/MCUs will be provided in upcoming releases.

Required Resources

To build and run the Synergy Device Identity Application example, you need the following resources:

Development tools and software

- e² studio ISDE v7.3.0 or later ([renessasynergy.com/devtools/e2studio](https://renesas-synergy.com/devtools/e2studio)), or IAR Embedded Workbench® for Renesas Synergy™ v8.23.3 or later ([renessasynergy.com/devtools/ewsyn](https://renesas-synergy.com/devtools/ewsyn))
- Synergy Software Package (SSP) v1.6.0 or later ([renessasynergy.com/software/ssp](https://renesas-synergy.com/software/ssp)), Synergy Standalone Configurator (SSC) 7_3_0_R20190109 or later ([renessasynergy.com/devtools/ssc](https://renesas-synergy.com/devtools/ssc))
- SEGGER J-link® USB driver ([renessasynergy.com/devtools/jlink](https://renesas-synergy.com/devtools/jlink))

Hardware

- Renesas Synergy PK-S5D9 kit ([renessasynergy.com/kits/pk-s5d9](https://renesas-synergy.com/kits/pk-s5d9)) or AE-CLOUD2 kit
- Test PC running Windows 7/10 OS
- Two Micro USB cables

Prerequisites and Intended Audience

This application note assumes you have some experience with the Renesas e² studio ISDE and the Synergy Software Package (SSP). Before you perform the procedures in this application note, follow the procedure in the *SSP User Manual* to build and run the Blinky project. Doing so enables you to become familiar with the e² studio and the SSP, and validates the debug connection so the board functions properly. In addition, this application note assumes that you have some knowledge of cryptography and familiarity with SCE features.

The intended audience are users who want to develop applications with SCE modules using Renesas Synergy™ S5 or S7 MCU Series.

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1. Introduction to IoT Security

This section provides an overview of IoT Security (in general) and covers the different aspects of the security features offered by Synergy MCUs.

1.1 Overview

A generic IoT (Internet of Things) environment consists of the following:

- IoT Devices
- Cloud Server
- Device Management services
- Certificate Authority (CA)




Figure 1. IoT Environment Overview

IoT Devices

IoT devices constitute the network of physical devices embedded with software, sensors, and connectivity that enable these devices to connect, collect, and exchange data. Devices can be in a secure or non-secure location, but all are increasingly vulnerable to attack.

Cloud Server

A portal providing everyday services and access to those devices. Typically located in a highly secure and controlled data center.

Device Management Services

Device Management services offers a comprehensive suite of IoT device management to enable any size IoT customer to have complete control over their devices and data. This includes, but is not limited to:

- Application Security
 - Keys/certificates identifying the Cloud Server
- Device Management Security
 - Keys/certificates identifying each unique IoT Device
 - Keys/certificates identifying Device Management Services Server
 - Initial firmware deployment and subsequent firmware updates. Firmware contains a signature verifying its authenticity and may be encrypted.

Certificate Authority (CA)

An authorized and trusted entity that issues certificates as a service is commonly referred to as CA. Certificates are used to give identity to public keys; thus, the devices that contain those keys. How a certificate is generated for a key is a well-defined process that is part of your security scheme. A Certificate Authority can be public or private. If the devices are managed in a tight eco-system (for example, devices for Industrial setting), the CA is likely to be private. If the devices are distributed through a consumer channel where the services and hardware are likely to be provided by different vendors (for example, surveillance cameras, thermostats, home security systems, and so forth.), the CA is likely to be public.

1.2 Importance of Device Identity in an IoT Ecosystem

With an establishment of a strong device identity, each IoT device can uniquely be identified and authenticated when they are connected to ensure secure and encrypted communication between other devices, services and users.

Strong device identity addresses core IoT security requirements:

- **Trust**
When a device connects to the network, it must authenticate and establish trust between other devices, services and users. Once trust is established, devices, users and services can securely communicate and exchange encrypted data and information.
- **Privacy**
As more IoT devices connect, more data is generated, collected, and shared. This data can include personal, sensitive, and financial information that must be kept private and secured — often under regulatory compliance. A device identity can ensure authentication, identification when the IoT devices are connected to one another.
- **Integrity**
Device integrity applies to both the devices and data being transmitted within the IoT ecosystem. The integrity of a device starts with proving it is what it says it is. With a strong unique device identity, it can be ensured that the devices are legitimate — reducing counterfeit products and protecting a company's brand. Data integrity is an often-overlooked requirement, but connected devices and systems rely on the authenticity and reliability of the information being transmitted.

1.3 Synergy Hardware Security Features

Synergy MCUs provides a hardware root-of-trust via protected memory (read/write) which can only be accessed by firmware modules located in secured memory segments. Protected memory features offered by Synergy devices can be used for storing the secure boot code and device certificate/keys amongst other sensitive data which are vital for device identity application.

1.3.1 ARM MPU

The ARM MPU is a memory protection function for the CPU that can be used to define memory access permissions (that is, privileged access only or full access) and memory attributes (to be buffered/cached) for different memory regions.

- ARM MPU can support up to eight programmable memory regions, each with their own programmable starting addresses, size, and settings.
- Using a Memory Protection Unit (MPU) can protect applications from many potential errors, ranging from undetected programming errors to errors introduced by system or hardware failures.

Configuration details of the ARM MPU is outside the scope of this application project. For more information for the ARM MPU operation and functionality, see the applicable *Synergy MCU Hardware User's Manual*.

1.3.2 Bus Master MPU

Bus master MPU monitors the addresses accessed by the bus masters in the entire MCU address space (0000 0000h to FFFF FFFFh). The access control information, consisting of read and write permissions, can be independently set for up to 32 regions. The bus master MPU monitors access to each region based on these settings.

- If access to a protected region is detected, the bus master MPU generates a reset or non-maskable interrupt (NMI).
- There are three Bus master MPU groups

- DMA Bus (group A)
- ETHER Bus (group B)
- GPX Bus (group C)
- The secure MPU regions are protected from the bus masters.

Configuration details of the Bus Master MPU are outside the scope of this application project. For more information on the Bus Master MPU operation and functionality, see the applicable *Synergy MCU Hardware User's Manual*.

1.3.3 Bus Slave MPU

Bus slave MPU monitors access to the bus slave functions, such as flash or SRAM. The function can be accessed from four bus masters, the CPU, and bus master MPU groups A, B, and C as follows:

- Bus slave MPU has a separate protection register for each of the four bus masters, with independent access protection control, consisting of read and write permission.
- If access to a protected region is detected, the bus slave MPU generates a reset or NMI, and can store the bus error address, bus error status, and error access status.

Configuration details of the Bus Master MPU is outside the scope of this application project. For more information for the Bus Master MPU operation and functionality, see the applicable *Synergy MCU Hardware User's Manual*.

1.3.4 Security MPU

Synergy MCUs incorporate a security MPU with four secured regions. The four secure regions include individual areas in Code flash, SRAM, and two security function regions. These regions can only be accessed by *secure code*. Secure regions are protected from unauthorized accesses by:

- A non-secure program
- Additional bus masters, such as DMA, DTC, and so on
- Debugger interface

This mechanism allows untrusted code to exist and operate alongside trusted code. The security MPU settings are stored in flash and activated before fetching the reset vector.

For more details on the Security MPU, see the applicable *Synergy MCU Hardware User's Manual*.

1.3.5 Flash Access Window

Flash Access Window (FAW) registers are used to set the code flash address range, which can be erased/programmed. Addresses that are outside this range, referred to as outside the FAW, cannot be modified once programmed. This feature is used to prevent the device identity (keys/certifications) from being erased or reprogrammed.

The example application project provided with this package includes a code reference to configure the FAW using APIs provided by SSP for the device identity use case. Users can also refer to Secure data in the rest application project for additional use cases on the FAW configuration.

For more details on FAW, see the *SSP User's Manual* link in the reference section.

Note: The FAW is set to the area of flash that can be written, so the area of memory that is LOCKED is the inverse of the FAW address range.

One Time Programmable Setting

The FAW and MPU registers can be permanently set using the one-time programmable setting FSPR bit. The FSPR bit must only be set once, when all the settings are confirmed, and the device is ready to leave the production floor.

In use cases where the Renesas Secure Boot Manager is used, the FSPR settings are done in the boot loader code. In this case, the application needs for allocating memory regions to securely store device certificates/keys should be considered as part of Secure boot loader design.

It is important this bit is set to prevent the FAW and MPU registers themselves from being modified in the field. For example, when using the Security MPU, set the FAW and FSPR bit to lock the MPU settings.

1.3.6 Secure Crypto Engine Module

The Secure Crypto Engine (SCE) is a Synergy hardware peripheral that provides several security features, NIST certified algorithms, and support for primitive cryptographic algorithms.

There are three variants of the security hardware peripherals available in Synergy MCUs, as shown in the following figure.

- SCE 7
- SCE 5
- Security and Encryption




Figure 2. Security Hardware Peripherals Available in Synergy MCUs

The SCE engine Synergy devices provide is used by the example application project in the following areas:

- Generate ECC key pairs (public and wrapped private key)
- Sign the challenge string using the ECC private key

2. Overview of Key Generation in Synergy MCUs

2.1 Key Wrapping

Device keys generated inside the Synergy MCU using the SCE hardware module can be either in plain text or wrapped.

Plaintext Keys

Plaintext refers to information or data in an unencrypted or unprotected form that is readable by a human or a machine and can be used without the need for any special processing. Plaintext can be used on other systems and must be protected when they are private keys.

Wrapped Keys

A wrapped key is a key encrypted by the SCE using a method that involves the MCU's unique ID. Because it requires the MCU's unique ID to unwrap the key, the key can only be unwrapped by the same MCU that wrapped it. Therefore, key wrapping on Synergy MCUs is considered secure, as a wrapped key can only be used on the Synergy MCU on which it was generated, and it cannot be used outside of that MCU.

Wrapped keys provide the following advantages:

- A wrapped key can only be used on the Synergy MCU on which it was generated.
- It cannot be moved to another Synergy MCU. If moved to another Synergy device, the original key cannot be recovered from the wrapped key.

2.2 Key Generation in the Device

This is the common use case where the device specific key is generated inside the Synergy MCU using the SCE module. To generate the device key using the SSP, the SF Crypto Key framework module is used.

The SF_CRYPTO_KEY Framework provides a high-level API. The framework is implemented as the SF_CRYPTO_KEY SSP module. The SF_CRYPTO_KEY Framework provides cryptographic key generation services through the SCE HAL module, which in turn drives the SCE IP on the device.

SF CRYPTO KEY Framework Module Features

The following key types can be generated using the services of the SF_CRYPTO_KEY module using SCE7 hardware:

- RSA 2048-bit, 1024-bit plain text/raw keys in standard, and Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) format
- RSA 2048-bit, 1024-bit standard format wrapped private keys (public keys in plain text)
- AES 128-bit, 192-bit and 256-bit wrapped keys for ECB, CBC, CTR and GCM chaining modes
- AES 128-bit and 256-bit wrapped keys for XTS chaining mode
- ECC 192-bit, 256-bit plain-text/raw public keys and wrapped private keys.

In this application, crypto HAL module is used to generate wrapped ECC keys. The reason the crypto HAL module is used instead of SF_CRYPTO_KEY framework is that the device identity application can be used in non-RTOS use cases, as well such as the Secure Boot Manager provided by Renesas.

2.3 Key Injection from Secure Infrastructure

Key Injection is a security feature that is meant for use cases where a key is generated external to the MCU device in a secure facility and then injected into the MCU. In general, the RSA key generation takes more time when generated inside the MCU compared to if it was generated external to the device (through a PC tool) inside a secure facility.

If hardware-based unique identity is not a requirement for the application, and/or if it is necessary to securely inject customer-specific keys, key injection can be utilized. This process will be covered by a separate Application Project.

3. Device Identity Design Overview

In this section explains how Synergy hardware and software features are integrated to create a unique device identity for each device.

Key Generation

The first step in creating a device identity is key generation. The keys can be either generated inside the Synergy MCU or they can be generated outside in a secure facility and injected into the Synergy device. Each methodology has its pros and cons on their approach. Based on the customer use case, the decision must be made.

Certificate Authority (CA)

Once the device keys are generated/injected an entity issues the proper digital certificates. A CA can be either public or private CA located in the Cloud or in an on-premises CA (local CA), which would typically be hosted on a secure server.

Securing Device Identity

Once the device identity is created and programmed on the Synergy device, it must be securely stored to prevent being stolen or corrupted. This can be achieved by using the Security MPU and FAW features offered by Synergy MCU. The features configure a portion of internal code flash as secure code and data regions. The secure code region contains API functions that are only authorized to work on the secure data region. The secure data region contains key information such as device certificates. This section cannot be accessed or modified by any un-secure code running on the Synergy MCU.

The Security MPU settings are locked using the FAW feature (using one-time programmable FPSR bit) before leaving the secure facility (programming center) to prevent them from being modified.

4. Device Identity Application Example

4.1 Overview

This example application project demonstrates the Renesas Synergy™ device identity application using the onboard Synergy SCE modules. For demonstration purposes, this application uses a local Certificate Authority (CA), The CA runs on a windows PC to generate a signing key and the root CA will be used to sign the device certificate. This project will be upgraded later to use a third-party CA to generate the device certificate. USB-CDC is used as the primary communication interface between the PK-S5D9/AE-CLOUD2 kit and the host console application running on the Windows PC.

4.2 Software Architecture Overview

The following figure shows the overall software architecture of the Synergy device identity application project.




Figure 3. Synergy Device Identity Application Software Architecture

The major software components of this application are:

- USBX CDC Device framework
- r_sce crypto driver
- r_flash_hp flash driver

The application contains the following thread:

- Main Thread

Main Thread

This is the main control thread which handles the following functions:

1. Incoming/outgoing USB data using the USBX CDC Device framework.
2. Decodes the command and calls the appropriate command handler functions, which in turn handle the corresponding command functionalities.

The following commands are handled by the Main Thread:

- WRAPPER_KEY_REQUEST
- WRAPPED_KEY_CERT_PROGRAM
- WRAPPED_KEY_CHALLENGE_RESP

WRAPPER_KEY_REQUEST

This command is handled by the following API function: `handleHrkKeyCreation ()`

This function handles the key generation using SSP Crypto modules. This application supports ECC Key pair generation. The public/private key pairs generated in the application are wrapped. Once the key pair is generated, the public key is sent to the host application to be used for the device certificate.

The wrapped private key is stored internally in the data flash that will later be used for signing the challenge response.

WRAPPED_KEY_CERT_PROGRAM

This command is handled by the following API function: `handleHrkCertProgram ()`

This function handles programming the device certificate received from the host application into the secure region of the internal code flash.

WRAPPED_KEY_CHALLENGE_RESP

This command is handled by the following API function: `handleHrkCertChallengeResp ()`

The intention of this challenge request is to allow the target to prove its ownership of the device private key for the corresponding public key being certified.

This function handles the challenge response request sent by the host application. Once the request is received, it signs the string sent as part of the request using the private key generated as part of WRAPPER_KEY_REQUEST command. The signed string is sent back to the host application for verification. Once the host application receives the signed string, it verifies the signature using the device public key extracted from the device certificate. When the signature validation is successful, the host application sends the device certificate to the device to be stored securely using Security MPU and FAW.

4.3 Operational Overflow




Figure 4. Operational Overflow

This application project consists of two software projects:

- Embedded project running on the PK-S5D9/AE-CLOUD2 kit
- Host application running on Windows (7/10) PC.

On powering up the PK-S5D9/AE-CLOUD2 kit, the embedded software initializes the platform and the underlying USB CDC stack that is used for communication with the host application running on Windows PC. At end of initialization, the embedded software is waiting for the USB device connect event. Once the user connects the kit to the Windows PC through USB cable, the USB device detection event is processed, and the USB CDC instance is created. At this stage, the embedded software is waiting for the commands from the host application.

When the user runs the host utility on the Windows PC, it scans the available COM ports and opens the port to which the PK-S5D9/AE-CLOUD2 kit is connected. Once the COM port is opened successfully, it generates a signing key and root CA certificate that will later be used to sign the device certificate. Now, the host application generates the **WRAPPER_KEY_REQUEST** command and sends it to the kit. On receiving this request, the embedded code running on the target kit generates device key pairs and sends out the public key to the host application. On the host application, it receives the public key from the device, generates a device certificate (signed by CA's signing key).

Before issuing the device certificate, the host application issues a challenge string to the device to prove that the device owns the private key. The embedded software, on receiving the challenge string, then signs it using its private key and sends it back to the host application. The host application validates the signature using the device public key and if the validation is successful, the device certificate is sent to the PK-S5D9/AE-CLOUD2 kit to be securely stored using the Security MPU and FAW on the Synergy MCU.

4.4 Securely Storing Device Identity

The following two unique device identities are created as part of this application:

- Wrapped ECC private key
- Device certificate

These two device identities need to be securely stored inside the Synergy MCU using the security MPU and FAW to avoid being accessed and modified. The private key generated as part of this application is already wrapped, so the step to securely store the device key can be skipped. However, in some cases, users prefer to also store the wrapped key in a secure location to avoid being misused in the device. This can be done using the same steps used to store the device certificate.

Following is the memory map of the current device identity application project.




Figure 5. Memory Map used in the Application Project

The left side of Figure 5 shows the memory layout of the code flash in this application project. The green color denotes the area where the application resides, orange color denotes the area reserved for storing the device certificate, and blue color denotes the area reserved for the secure code region that accesses the secure data region.

As shown in the preceding memory map, the address region between 0x0 to 0x2000 contains the Security MPU settings, and the address region from 0xFE000 (block aligned address boundary) contains secure data and secure code that needs to be protected from being erased by the user application. To achieve this protection, the FAW is configured to protect the memory regions 0x2000 to 0xFE000. By setting the FAW start address to 0x2000 and the end address to 0xFE000, the sections outside these address regions are protected from being modified. See the flash_FAW_Set() API found in the file, Synergy_Device_Identity_Solution\embedded\common\src\framedProtocolTarget.c file. This file implements the FAW settings.

The right side of Figure 5 shows the SRAM region memory map in this application project. The SSP flash driver module (r_flash_hp) is mapped to the bottom portion of the SRAM that has been configured as a secured SRAM region. This region is needed to allow the flash driver to erase and program the secure data region while loading the device certificate.

See the linker script associated with the example application project to see how these secured data/code/SRAM regions are allocated and mapped. Also see the Synergy configurator settings as shown in Figure 6 for details on how to configure a region in internal code flash as a secure region. The user can use this example as a reference in their design when allocating a specific region in code flash/SRAM as a secured location for storing the device identities and other application specific modules, such as protected IP or third-party licensed FW, and so on.




Figure 6. Security MPU settings using e² studio ISDE Configurator

5. Running the Device Identity Application Example

5.1 Importing, Building, and Running the Project for e² studio

The embedded projects are included in the folder `Synergy_Device_Identity_Solution\embedded`. The following instructions will show the user how to import these projects in their e² studio workspace.

1. In e² studio ISDE, select **File -> Import... -> Existing Projects into Workspace** and browse to the above folder in the **Select Root Directory** section:




Figure 7. Importing the Project

2. Select to import all projects as shown in the following figure. DO NOT CHECK the “Copy projects into workspace” box.




Figure 8. Selection for Importing All Projects

5.2 Powering up the Board

To connect power to the board, use the following instructions.

1. Connect the micro USB end of the supplied USB cable to the PK-S5D9 board J19 connector (DEBUG_USB) or AE-CLOUD2 board J6 connector (DEBUG_USB).

Note: The kit contains a SEGGER J-Link® On-board (OB). J-Link provides full debug and programming for the PK-S5D9/AE-Cloud2 board.

2. Connect the other end of the USB cable to the USB port on the workstation.


5.3 Debugging using ITM printf

In the embedded application project given in this package, there are number of `printf ()` statements to output information about the system. Rather than using the “Renesas Debug Console” in e² studio that uses semi-hosted printf which is intrusive into the Synergy processor’s real-time execution, the project is set up to use printf via SWO. The output of the SWO printf can be captured and viewed directly within e² studio using the “Live Trace Console” window. However, the “Live Trace Console” has poor performance when capturing printf output, as every packet (that is, character) that is captured from SWO is time-stamped and saved into a trace file in the project. Instead, the SWO Viewer shipped with the JLink software tools can be used to display the output of the SWO printf and with much better performance.

5.4 Verifying the Demonstration


At this stage, it is assumed section 5.1 was used to import, build, and load the application project into the target kit. If not, go back to section 5.1 and follow the instructions before continuing this section.

1. Start a debug session for the e² studio project and run to `main ()`.



2. Run the JLink SWO viewer found under `C:\Program Files (x86)\SEGGER\JLink_v632f\JLinkSWOViewer.exe`.
3. In the configuration dialog box, choose the device as **R7FS5D97E**, click the **Measure** button, then replace the CPU clock (kHz) with **60000**.

Note: The JLINK tool used in this application is v6.32f. It is recommended to use JLINK tool v6.32f or greater.



4. Click **OK**. Ensure **port 0** is selected as the data source.



5. Resume execution of the project. The output from the SWO printf can be seen in the SWO viewer.





Figure 9. Welcome Message on SWO Viewer

6. Now, connect one end of a micro USB cable to the USB device port on the target kit. Connect the other end to the window PC.
7. Use the following link for steps to load the Synergy USB CDC Communication driver for Windows (7/10) PC: renesas.com/en-us/products/synergy/software/add-ons/usb-cdc-drivers.html.
The target kit displays as the Synergy USB Communication Port in the Device Manager. Make a note of the COM port number of the target kit from the device manager.
8. In the SWO viewer, the following messages display on the console, indicating that the USB CDC instance is created and it is ready for the host application.




9. Now, run the host application on the windows PC. To run the application, open the command window in the windows PC and navigate to the folder where this application project is stored. The deploy.exe file is located in the Synergy_Device_Identity_Solution\pc\apps\deploy\Release directory.
10. To run the host application, type the following command on the command window:
`deploy.exe connect <COM port Number>`

```
C:\work\MQTT_TLS\Security_AP\Synergy_Device_Identity_Solution\pc\apps\deploy\Release>deploy.exe connect 2  
  
argc = 3, argv[1] = connect, argv[2] = 2  
Scanning for devices on port 2  
Initialising connection to COM port [2]  
Initialised connection to COM port [2] OK  
Issuing Generate Key command to device  
Create the cert signed by signing key (local CA instance)  
Successful challenge/response  
Sending device Certificate to the device, len = 944  
Device Cert succesfully created and programmed into device
```

Figure 10. Host application console messages

Notice the console messages from the host application shown above with the following console message on the SWO viewer.



```
SEGGER J-Link SWO Viewer V6.32f  
File Edit Help  
Data from stimulus port(s): 31 24 23 16 15 8 7 0  
 Stay on top [Clear] [Stop] [Pause]  
Enabling framed data protocol over USB  
Connect the kit to Host PC...  
USB CDC instance created. Run the Device Id Host application!!!  
  
cmdCode = 40, numBytes = 0  
  
Received WRAPPER_KEY_REQUEST request  
hwCreateKey successful  
  
cmdCode = 45, numBytes = 32  
  
Received WRAPPED_KEY_CHALLENGE_RESP command  
ChallengeResp successful. Responding with signed Hashed data  
  
cmdCode = 43, numBytes = 944  
  
WRAPPED_KEY_CERT_PROGRAM request received  
Successfully erased code flash!!!  
Successfully wrote the Device Cert in the flash  
WRAPPED_KEY_CERT_PROGRAM cmd successful !!!  
Flash write validation of Device Cert succeeded
```

Figure 11. Console Messages on Target Kit

At this stage, the host application starts communicating with the target through the USB-CDC communication interface. User application does the following tasks as shown in section 4.3:

1. Scans for the USB COM port provided by the user. If found, it opens the serial connection.
2. On successful serial connection, it issues the **Generate Key Command** to the target kit.
3. On the device side, the ECC key pairs are generated using SCE crypto modules. The public key is sent back to the host application.
4. The host application creates root CA and signing key to be used to sign the device certificate at the latter stage.
5. Generates a challenge/response string and sends it to the target kit.
6. On successful challenge/response, the host application signs and sends the device certificate to the device.
7. The device certificate is securely stored in the internal code flash and protected by Security MPU and FAW.

6. Importing and Building the Project: IAR Embedded Workbench

Follow the steps in the enclosed [r11an0023eu0121-synergy-ssp-import-guide.pdf](#) to import the project **Synergy_DeviceID_PK_S5D9** in IAR EW for Renesas Synergy™.




Figure 12. Successful import screen

7. Adding Required Files

Using the File Explorer, locate where the original application program folder is located and copy the project related common files to `Synergy\Source Files\src` folder.

- Copy the `framedProtocolCommon.c` file from `Synergy_Device_Identity_Solution\common\src` to the top-level `src` folder.
- Copy the `flash.c` file from `Synergy_Device_Identity_Solution\embedded\common\src` to top-level `src` folder.
- Copy the `framedProtocolTarget.c` file from `Synergy_Device_Identity_Solution\embedded\common\src` to top-level `src` folder.

Note: Files can also be added through a right-click on the `src` folder (in IAR project workspace) and select **Add ->Add files** select the files from the aforementioned paths.

8. Building and Running the Project




Figure 13. Successful build message

9. Device Identity Application Next Steps

This section provides a high-level overview of phase 2 features planned for device identity application.

Support for Third-party CA

In phase 1, the application project uses local CA running on a windows PC to create a self-signed root certificate, generating a device certificate signed by the local CA's signing key. In phase 2, an update the application project is planned that uses a standard third-party CA to generate the device certificate.

As part of this feature, we are planning to create a generic interface that can allow plugging in another CA seamlessly.

Support for interface to cloud providers (AWS, Google, Azure)

Current phase of Synergy Cloud connectivity solutions for AWS/Google Cloud/Azure uses the device keys and certificates generated by the Cloud CA. These projects will be updated to use the Renesas supported third-party CA for generating device identities.

Support for interface to SBM

After adding the support for standard third-party CA, this feature will be integrated with the existing Synergy Secure Boot Manager.

Support for Key injection

Key Injection is a security feature that is meant for use cases where a key is generated external to the MCU device in a secure facility and then injected into the MCU. This support will be documented separately.

10. References

- SSP User Manual ([renesassynergy.com/ssp](https://renesas.com/ssp))
- Secure Boot Manager Application Project (renesas.com/us/en/software/D6002619.html)
- Secure Data-at-rest application

11. Known Issues and Limitations

The host application is tested only on Windows (7/10) PC.

12. Appendix

12.1 Glossary

Term	Meaning
Certificate Authority (CA)	An entity that issues digital certificates according to policy-based rules. A CA could be public or private, located in the Cloud, or in the case of an on-premises CA, typically hosted on a secure appliance.
Device Certificate	Certificate uniquely identifying an individual Synergy device. It is digitally signed, asserting that the certificate comes from a known source and has not been modified, and that the device is trusted (has the Secure Boot Manager installed along with trusted application firmware).
Root of Trust	Roots of trust are highly reliable hardware, firmware, and software components that perform specific, critical security functions. https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/hardware-roots-of-trust
SCE	Secure Crypto Engine – A module in the MCU that provides for efficient, low-power cryptographic acceleration TRNG (True Random Number Generation) and creation and isolation of isolating cryptographic keys.
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure – A set of roles, policies, and procedures needed to create, manage, distribute, use, store, and revoke digital certificates, which are typically used to manage secure identity via public key cryptography.
Key Pair	Asymmetric keys are generated in pairs – a public and private key. The private key is held in secret by only one party and can be used to assert that party's identity. The public key is freely distributed and is uniquely associated with the private key.
Secure Code	A function or group of functions that reside in a secure region of internal flash, as defined and enforced by the MPUs. These secure functions can access both secure data and non-secure data regions.
Non-Secure code	A function or group of functions which resides in a non-secure region of internal flash. These non-secure codes cannot access the secure region. They can only access the non-secure region.
HRK	Hidden Root Key. This is a unique key stored inside the Synergy MCU.
SBM	Secure Boot Manager is a collection of software that allows secure download, booting, and update of the application binaries on the Synergy MCU.
Challenge String	Randomly generated string at the host application. This string is used by the host application to validate the ownership of the private key by the target.
Unique ID	An identification value, unique to each individual Synergy MCU, that is stored inside the Synergy MCU. The unique ID is used by the SCE when it wraps a key.
Challenge Response String	The response to the challenge string. The Challenge Response String is the signature of the challenge data as created by signing the Challenge String with the receiver's private key.

Website and Support

Visit the following vanity URLs to learn about key elements of the Synergy Platform, download components and related documentation, and get support.

Synergy Software	www.renesas.com/synergy/software
Synergy Software Package	www.renesas.com/synergy/ssp
Software add-ons	www.renesas.com/synergy/addons
Software glossary	www.renesas.com/synergy/softwareglossary
Development tools	www.renesas.com/synergy/tools
Synergy Hardware	www.renesas.com/synergy/hardware
Microcontrollers	www.renesas.com/synergy/mcus
MCU glossary	www.renesas.com/synergy/mcuglossary
Parametric search	www.renesas.com/synergy/parametric
Kits	www.renesas.com/synergy/kits
Synergy Solutions Gallery	www.renesas.com/synergy/solutionsgallery
Partner projects	www.renesas.com/synergy/partnerprojects
Application projects	www.renesas.com/synergy/applicationprojects
Self-service support resources:	
Documentation	www.renesas.com/synergy/docs
Knowledgebase	www.renesas.com/synergy/knowledgebase
Forums	www.renesas.com/synergy/forum
Training	www.renesas.com/synergy/training
Videos	www.renesas.com/synergy/videos
Chat and web ticket	www.renesas.com/synergy/resourcelibrary

Revision History

Rev.	Date	Description	
		Page	Summary
1.00	Oct.24.18	—	Initial Release
1.01	Mar.27.19	1	Specified developers of applications with SCE modules using Renesas Synergy™ S5D9, S5D5, and S5D3 MCUs as audience.
1.02	Oct.01.19	1, 18-19	Updated development tool and software versioning. Added chapters 6, 7, 8.

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