

RA4L1 MCU Group

Security Manual**Introduction**

The RA4L1 MCU Group incorporates many features that can be used to protect the content and operation of the MCU when it is integrated into an end product. This document describes these features and provides general recommendations for their use. Associated Application Notes and other applicable documents that provide more details are listed for reference.

Since the RA4L1 is a general purpose MCU, this Security Manual cannot offer specific guidance for all possible use cases, nor can it provide system-level security guidance. It is highly recommended that the application developer conducts a security analysis of the system into which the RA4L1 is integrated and create a threat model and security policy for the system and for the RA4L1, for example, using the ISO/SAE 21434 Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) approach. It is the application developer's responsibility to decide what RA4L1 security features are necessary for the end product and to implement them appropriately.

Although this Security Manual describes best secure practices for configuring the RA4L1 at the time of its release, the microcontroller threat landscape is constantly changing and evolving. Please refer to the Notice at the end of this document.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Overview

This application note describes the security-related features of the RA4L1 MCU Group and offers guidance as to how to use these features to create a product that has the appropriate level of cybersecurity based on the threat model for the intended application.

NOTE: Ultimately, it is up to the discretion of the application developer to determine how to design the security architecture of the end product and what security features to employ. Critical items relating to proper functioning of the MCU and possible security threats are noted in red sections.

1.2 Security Features

The RA4L1 MCU provides the following security-related features:

- MCU product and chip-unique identification
- Hardware-enforced isolation using Arm® TrustZone® technology
- The RSIP-E11A integrated security engine provides cryptographic functions and secure key handling
- Immutable memory
- Various tamper detection features
- Device Lifecycle Management and authenticated debug
- Secure Factory Programming

The RA Flexible Software Package (FSP) is the Renesas software platform available for use with the RA4L1 MCU Group. The FSP provides support for security solutions that are often required to secure an end-product, including:

- Creation of a cryptographic identity
- Secure boot
- Secure firmware updates

1.3 References

The following documents are referenced in this application note. These documents are available from the Renesas website www.renesas.com.

Table 1. References

Reference	Document Name	Document Number or URL
[RA4L1 User Manual]	RA4L1 Group User's Manual: Hardware	R01UH1081
[FSP User Manual]	RA Flexible Software Package Documentation	RA Flexible Software Package Documentation: Introduction (renesas.github.io)
[Boot Firmware]	Renesas Boot Firmware for the RA4L1 MCU Group	R01AN7681

1.4 Additional Guidance Documentation

The following additional guidance documents are referenced in this application note. Please note that due to documentation update cycles, the RA4L1 MCU Group may not be explicitly referenced in the latest version of these documents. These documents are available from the Renesas website www.renesas.com.

Table 2. References

Reference	Document Name	Document Number
[Bootloader Basic]	RA6 Basic Secure Bootloader Using MCUboot and Internal Code Flash	R11AN0497
[Bootloader Dual Bank]	RA6 MCU Advanced Secure Bootloader Design using MCUboot and Code Flash Dualbank	R11AN0570
[Bootloader Encrypted]	RA6 Booting Encrypted Image using MCUboot and QSPI	R11AN0567
[Design with TrustZone]	Security Design with Arm TrustZone	R11AN0467
[Device Identity]	Device Identity with RSIP and TrustZone	R11AN0979
[DLM]	Renesas RA Family Device Lifecycle Management for Cortex-M33	R11AN0469
[Plaintext Key Injection]	Injecting Plaintext User Keys	R11AN0473
[RA Tooling Primer]	RA Arm® TrustZone® Tooling Primer	R20AN0577
[RSIP Modes]	Renesas Security Engine Operational Modes	R11AN0498
[Secure Factory Programming]	RA8 Secure Factory Programming	R01AN7516
[Secure Key Injection]	Injection and Updating Secure User Keys for RA Family	R11AN0496

1.5 Abbreviations and Legend

The following abbreviations are used in this document.

Table 3. Abbreviations and Legend

Abbreviation	Meaning
BSP	Board Support Package
CAC	Clock Frequency Accuracy Measurement Circuit
DLM	Device Lifecycle Management
DPL	Deployed
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH/ECDHE	Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (Ephemeral)
FSP	Flexible Software Package
HRK	Hardware Root Key
HUK	Hardware Unique Key
IDAU	Implementation Defined Attribution Unit
IDE	Interactive Development Environment
ISR	Interrupt Service Routine
KAS	Key Agreement Scheme
KUK	Key-Update Key
LCK_BOOT	Lock Factory Bootloader
LCK_DBG	Lock Debugger
LVD	Low Voltage Detection
MAC	Message Authentication Code
MPU	Memory Protection Unit
NSECDBG_KEY	Non-secure Debug Key
NSECSD	Non-secure System Debug

RASC	RA Smart Configurator
RMA_KEY	Return Material Authorisation Key
RFP	Renesas Flash Programmer
RSIP	Renesas Secure IP
RTC	Realtime Clock
SECDBG_KEY	Secure Debug Key
SSD	Secure System Debug
SKMT	Security Key Management Tool
TRNG	True Random Number Generator
TSN	Temperature Sensor
UFPK	User Factory Programming Key
W-UFPK	Wrapped User Factory Programming Key

The following figure shows the concepts that are illustrated in graphics in this document.




Symbol	Meaning
	A cryptographic key (plaintext)
	A cryptographic key encrypted by another key (inner key encrypted by the outer key)
	A cryptographic key wrapped (encrypted plus MAC) by another key (inner key wrapped by the outer key)

Figure 1. Graphical Representations of Cryptographic Keys

1.6 Software Platform

The RA Flexible Software Package (FSP) is a software package provided by Renesas for developing applications on RA Family MCUs. The FSP provides Board Support Packages, HAL drivers, and middleware for RA Family MCUs.

The FSP Platform Installer includes the e² studio IDE, toolchain, and FSP packs. Alternatively, the FSP Standalone Installer plus the RA Smart Configurator can be used with the IAR Embedded Workbench IDE or Arm Keil MDK.

These installers, plus additional information, can be found at www.renesas.com/fsp.

1.7 Vulnerability Reporting

Renesas is committed to proactively addressing any potential security vulnerabilities within our products. To report a security vulnerability, please go to www.renesas.com/psirt and follow the instructions on the web page.

2. Identity

2.1 MCU Group Identity

The RA4L1 MCU Group chips contain a 16-byte read-only register that contains an immutable ASCII representation of the device part number. The PNR_n Part Numbering Registers are documented in the [RA4L1 User Manual], including a part number listing.

The PNR_n registers are located at addresses 0x0100_80F0 through 0x0100_80FF. The first seven ASCII digits of the PNR_n register must read “R7FA4L1” to indicate that the device is an RA4L1 MCU. The other

ASCII digits represent non-security related items such as package type, packing, operating temperature, and code flash memory size.

The contents of the PNRn are as follows (“x” is used to represent a “don’t care” value for security-related functionality):

Table 4. Part Numbering Register Values

Address	ASCII Representation (Little Endian)
0x0100_80F0	R7FA
0x0100_80F4	4L1x
0x0100_80F8	xxxx
0x0100_80FC	xxxx

For more details, refer to the following document:

- [RA4L1 User Manual]

2.2 Unique Identity

The RA4L1 MCU Group chips contain a 16-byte read-only register that contains an immutable 16-byte ID code (unique ID) for identifying the individual MCU. The UIDRn Unique ID Registers are documented in the [RA4L1 User Manual].

This value is guaranteed to be unique. It is serialised and, therefore, predictable, so it should not be used for identifying the end product if a random or pseudorandom identifier is required.

For more details, refer to the following document:

- [RA4L1 User Manual]

2.3 Cryptographic Identity

The RA4L1 MCU is not delivered with a provisioned cryptographic identity. The RSIP-E11A security engine can be used to create an ECC (secp256r1) cryptographic identity by using the key (pair) generation capability of the security engine, which is statistically unique based on the SP800-90B conformance of the TRNG.

For more details, refer to the following documents and sections of this document:

- [RA4L1 User Manual]
- [FSP User Manual]
- [Device Identity]
- Section [5 RSIP-E11A Cryptographic Functions](#)
- Section [6 RSIP-E11A Random Number Generation](#)

3. Isolation

3.1 Arm® TrustZone®

The RA4L1 includes Arm TrustZone technology. TrustZone divides the system and the application into Secure and Non-secure domains. This separation applies to:

- On-chip flash memory (i.e. code flash)
- SRAM
- Peripherals
- Pins

For best security design practices, external memory should always be considered Non-secure.

The Secure, Non-secure Callable, and Non-secure regions of on-chip code flash and SRAM are enforced using an IDAU (Implementation Defined Attribution Unit). The address range boundaries for flash and SRAM are programmed in non-volatile flash and applied before the reset vector is fetched. This ensures that malicious code cannot override the boundaries. These values are calculated automatically by the e² studio IDE when the application code is built, and by default, they are programmed at the start of a debug session. If necessary, these calculated values can be adjusted prior to being programmed and programmed independently of the debug session.

The security configuration of pins and peripherals is done using Peripheral Security Attribution Registers. The FSP's Board Support Package start-up code will initialise these attribution registers for the pins and peripherals as per the configuration set in the application project using either the e² studio IDE or the RA Smart Configurator (RASC).

The system starts up in the Secure state. The application performs any secure initialisation, such as firmware authentication, and then jumps to the Non-secure region for main application processing. Execution of Non-secure region code is then governed by TrustZone usage restrictions, which require all calls to Secure region code to utilise Non-secure Callable veneers. These veneers and accompanying guard functions can be configured with the e² studio IDE.

TrustZone access violations will generate a TrustZone access error. The application can optionally alert and/or record these events for unauthorised access attempt logging.

TrustZone usage is not mandatory. It is the responsibility of the application developer to assess the security risks of a monolithic architecture, whether to utilize TrustZone as an isolation mechanism and what services and peripherals to place in the Secure region. The referenced documents below give some examples of how TrustZone can be used in an application.

For production programming, ensure that the TrustZone boundaries are accurately programmed. This must be done for all applications, even if TrustZone is not utilized by the application.

For more details, refer to the following documents:

- [RA4L1 User Manual]
- [RA Tooling Primer]
- [Design with TrustZone]

3.2 Memory Protection Unit (MPU)

The RA4L1 MCU Group contains an Arm Cortex-M33 core with an Arm MPU and a Bus Master MPU.

The Arm MPU can be used to protect memory regions by defining access permissions for different privilege states. See the Arm Developer documentation for more information about how to use the Arm MPU: [Armv8-M Memory Model and Memory Protection User Guide](#)

The Arm Bus Master MPU provides memory protection for bus masters other than the CPU, namely DMAC/DTC. If access to a protected region is detected, the Bus Master MPU generates an internal reset or a non-maskable interrupt.

For more details, refer to the following documents:

- [RA4L1 User Manual]

3.3 RSIP-E11A

The RSIP-E11A security engine is a cryptographic subsystem that is integrated into the MCU silicon managed and protected by the dedicated control logic. The cryptographic operations are physically isolated from the rest of the chip, with dedicated RAM for holding sensitive material (e.g., plaintext keys) during cryptographic operations. RSIP-E11A is further protected with TrustZone isolation technology.




Figure 2. RSIP-E11A On-chip Isolation

For more details, refer to the following documents and sections of this document:

- [RA4L1 User Manual]
- [RSIP Modes]
- Section [4 RSIP-E11A Secure Key Injection, Storage, and Usage](#)
- Section [5 RSIP-E11A Cryptographic Functions](#)
- Section [8.2 RSIP-E11A Protection Features](#)

4. RSIP-E11A Secure Key Injection, Storage, and Usage

4.1 RSIP-E11A Operational Modes

The RSIP-E11A can function in two operational modes: Protected Mode and Compatibility Mode. These modes are supported by different APIs, and they offer different levels of physical key protection.

The secure key storage mechanism is different between the two modes, resulting in incompatible securely stored keys. Therefore, the Flexible Software Package supports using **only one operational mode within a single project**. Note that applications that utilise a bootloader are implemented with a separate project for the bootloader, enabling the Protected Mode used by the bootloader and the Compatibility Mode used by the rest of the application.

For more details, refer to the following documents and sections of this document:

- [RSIP Modes]
- [FSP User Manual]
- [RSIP Modes]
- Section [8.2 RSIP-E11A Protection Features](#)

4.1.1 RSIP-E11A Protected Mode Operation

Protected Mode is designed to enforce best practice security design and implementation by supporting only the use of securely stored (i.e. wrapped) private keys. As such, the application can guarantee that there is no plaintext private key exposure on any CPU or externally accessible bus.

Both private and public keys must be securely injected. During the injection process, a MAC is appended to the key data. For most cryptography operations, this MAC is required; the only exception is for public keys used in Key Agreement Schemes (KAS) in support of ECDH/ECDHE.

Protected Mode is used via the FSP Crypto APIs, designed to be compatible across Renesas RA, RX, and RZ Families for simplified code reuse.

Refer to section [8.2 RSIP-E11A Protection Features](#) for more information about the protection features included in Protected Mode operation.

4.1.2 RSIP-E11A Compatibility Mode Operation

Compatibility Mode is designed to facilitate integration with legacy systems and software whilst still supporting secure key injection, storage, and usage. In Compatibility Mode, plaintext private keys can be used for cryptographic functions, simplifying integration with third-party stacks and libraries.

Compatibility Mode is used via the PSA Certified Crypto APIs, providing Arm ecosystem alignment.

Refer to section [8.2 RSIP-E11A Protection Features](#) for more information about the protection features included in Compatibility Mode operation.

Since plaintext key material can be present and used in the application, it is required that the developer evaluate and accept any associated risks.

For security best practices, private keys that are stored in non-volatile memory should be stored securely as per section [4.3 Secure and Plaintext Key Injection and Update](#). Depending on the threat model, it may be acceptable to store session keys in plaintext in RAM.

Plaintext private keys should be protected via other key protection mechanisms, such as isolation in the Secure region.

4.2 Secure Key Storage

The secure key storage mechanism leverages the chip's Hardware Unique Key, a 256-bit key that is unique for each chip and is accessible only by the RSIP-E11A security engine. Application keys that have been wrapped with this key via a key injection or key update process can be stored securely at any location in any memory. This mechanism provides unlimited secure key storage and cloning protection.

For additional protection, it is recommended to store wrapped keys in the Secure region if the application utilises TrustZone.

Keys that have been generated, injected, or updated in Protected Mode cannot be used in Compatibility Mode, and vice versa.

For more details, refer to the following documents:

- [RA4L1 User Manual]
- [FSP User Manual]
- [Secure Key Injection]
- [Plaintext Key Injection]

4.3 Secure and Plaintext Key Injection and Update

The secure key injection process leverages the MCU's hardware root key, a key that is contained within the RSIP-E11A security engine and is common across all chips. This key is used only for the secure key injection process. It is not used for secure storage of application keys, and it is not accessible outside the security engine.

There are some differences between Protected Mode and Compatibility Mode, but the basic concept for secure key injection is the same for both modes.

Keys that have been generated, injected, or updated in Protected Mode cannot be used in Compatibility Mode, and vice versa.

To protect both the Renesas MCU Hardware Root Key and the developer's application keys, no sensitive key material is transferred between Renesas and the application developer. Instead, as shown in [Figure 3.Secure Key Injection](#), the developer creates an intermediary key called a User Factory Programming Key (UFPK). This key is PGP-encrypted and sent to the Renesas Key Wrap Service, an automated secure server that wraps the UFPK (creating a W-UFPK), PGP-encrypts it, and returns it to the developer.

A non-trivial key that is not duplicated from Renesas examples or other publicly available cryptography references must be used for the UFPK.

Application keys are injected by providing both the W-UFPK and the UFPK-encrypted application key(s) to the RSIP-E11A. The security engine unwraps the W-UFPK to obtain the UFPK, then decrypts the encrypted application key. It then wraps the application key with the MCU's HUK. [Figure 3.Secure Key Injection](#) shows an overview of this process.

Key preparation steps where keys are exposed in plaintext must be performed in a secure environment.

It is recommended to use different UFPKs for prototype development with test keys and for production programming of mass production keys.

The RA4L1 cannot be personalised to accept only specific W-UFPKs for application key injection; therefore, the production programming flow must protect against malicious key injection. To guard against supply chain attacks, it is recommended to issue the "Initialize" boot firmware command to erase the chip prior to key injection.




Figure 3. Secure Key Injection

On the RA4L1, Protected Mode secure key injection is performed using the factory boot firmware, and Compatibility Mode secure key injection is performed using APIs contained in the FSP.

Renesas provides the following tools to support this process:

- Security Key Management Tool (SKMT), available here: <https://www.renesas.com/software-tool/security-key-management-tool>. This tool can create sample keys and prepare keys for secure key injection and secure key update.
- Renesas Flash Programmer (RFP), available here: <https://www.renesas.com/software-tool/renesas-flash-programmer-programming-gui>. This tool can securely inject Protected Mode keys using the MCU's factory boot firmware.

Select third-party programming tools that also support secure key injection.

Plaintext key injection is supported only by Compatibility Mode and is performed using APIs contained in the FSP.

The following sections provide more details about the secure and plaintext key injection and update processes.

For more details, refer to the following documents:

- [RA4L1 User Manual]
- [FSP User Manual]
- [Boot Firmware]
- [RSIP Modes]
- [Secure Key Injection]
- [Plaintext Key Injection]

4.3.1 RSIP-E11A Protected Mode Key Injection

Keys used with Protected Mode must be securely injected or securely updated. The wrapped keys can then be used with the FSP Crypto APIs.

Secure key injection is performed using the programming interface and the MCU's factory boot firmware. As shown in [Figure 4. Protected Mode Secure Key Injection](#), the W-UFPK and encrypted application key are both provided to the MCU using the appropriate factory boot firmware command. The factory boot firmware uses the security engine to decrypt the application key and wrap it with the MCU's HUK. The boot firmware then stores the key at the designated location in memory.

Keys injected via this mechanism cannot be used with the PSA Certified Crypto APIs, which use RSIP-E11A in Compatibility Mode.




Figure 4. Protected Mode Secure Key Injection

The production programming flow should be designed such that the programming interface is locked after secure key injection to prevent malicious key injection.

After the programming interface is locked (see section [12.1 Device Lifecycle Management and Debug Authentication](#)), application keys can no longer be injected. Instead, the application must be updated with new keys via Key-Update Keys (KUKs).

During initial provisioning, an application should be provisioned with one or more KUKs. As shown in [Figure 5.Key-Update Key Injection](#), Key-Update Key injection functions identically to application key injection.




Figure 5. Key-Update Key Injection

To update an application key, the new application key must be wrapped with the Key-Update Key. The application code then uses the appropriate FSP Crypto API to update the specific key type of the new application key. As shown in [Figure 6. Protected Mode Key Update](#), this enables secure key updates, with no plaintext key exposure outside the security engine.

Keys updated via this mechanism cannot be used with the PSA Certified Crypto APIs, which use RSIP-E11A in Compatibility Mode.




Figure 6. Protected Mode Key Update

4.3.2 RSIP-E11A Compatibility Mode Key Injection

Keys used with Compatibility Mode must use the FSP Key Injection module and be either securely injected or injected as plaintext. The wrapped keys can then be used with the PSA Certified Crypto APIs.

Keys injected via this mechanism cannot be used with the FSP Crypto APIs, which use RSIP-E11A in Protected Mode.

Secure key injection is performed using the FSP Key Injection module. As shown in [Figure 7. Compatibility Mode Secure Key Injection](#), the W-UFPK and encrypted application key are both provided to the API. The RSIP driver uses the security engine to decrypt the application key and wrap it with the MCU's HUK. The application code must then store the key at a designated location in memory.

It is recommended to not include either secure key injection API code or any W-UFPKs in end-product firmware. This can be done by utilising a programming tool that executes the secure key injection code from MCU RAM or by erasing the flash memory that contained the secure key injection code.




Figure 7. Compatibility Mode Secure Key Injection

Plaintext key injection is also performed using the FSP Key Injection module. As shown [Figure 8. Compatibility Mode Plaintext Key Injection](#), the plaintext application key is provided to the API. The RSIP driver uses the security engine to wrap the plaintext key with the MCU’s HUK. The application code must then store the wrapped key at a designated location in memory.




Figure 8. Compatibility Mode Plaintext Key Injection

There is no explicit support in Compatibility Mode for Key Update. It is recommended to securely inject one or more keys that will serve the role of Key-Update Keys and manually perform the decryption and plaintext key injection of the new key. See [Figure 9. Compatibility Mode Key Update](#) for an overview of this process.

Since there is plaintext key exposure outside the security engine, it is recommended to perform the entire key update operation in the Secure region.




Figure 9. Compatibility Mode Key Update

5. RSIP-E11A Cryptographic Functions and Key Generation

The RSIP-E11A security engine provides hardware acceleration for basic cryptographic functions. The FSP Crypto APIs (Protected Mode) and PSA Certified Crypto APIs (Compatibility Mode) provide any needed software support.

[Table 5.RSIP-E11A Cryptographic Operations](#) lists the cryptographic algorithms supported by the security engine. [Table 6.RSIP-E11A Key Generation](#) lists the cryptographic key generation supported by the security engine.

Application code should use cryptographic algorithms with sufficient strength as appropriate to the application's threat model.

Table 5. RSIP-E11A Cryptographic Operations

Algorithm	Operations	Specification	Key lengths	Modes
AES	Encryption, decryption, MAC	NIST FIPS PUB 197 NIST SP800-38A (ECB, CBC, CTR) NIST SP800-38B (CMAC) NIST SP800-38C (CCM) NIST SP800-38D (GCM, GMAC)	128 and 256 bits	ECB, CBC, CTR, CCM, GCM, CMAC, GMAC
ECC	Signature generation, signature verification	NIST FIPS PUB 186-5	Curve: NIST P-256	N/A
HMAC	Keyed Hash	NIST FIPS PUB 198-1	256 bits	SHA-256
KDF	Key Agreement	NIST SP 800-56A	128 and 256 bits	SHA-256
Key Wrapping	Wrap/Unwrap	RFC3394	128 and 256 bits	N/A
SHA	Hash	NIST FIPS PUB 180-4	N/A	SHA-224, SHA-256

Table 6. RSIP-E11A Key Generation

Algorithm	Specification	Key lengths
AES	NIST FIPS PUB 197	128 and 256 bits
ECC – SEC prime curve	FIPS PUB 186-5	256 bits

Signature verification implementation is designed for efficiency. As such, there are no redundancy checks to harden against fault injection attacks. If fault injection attacks are included in the application's threat model, it is recommended that critical signature verification and checks for the result of this verification are performed multiple times.

6. RSIP-E11A Random Number Generation

The RA4L1 MCU Group implements random number generation by utilising the True Random Number generation capability of the RSIP-E11A security engine. The TRNG implementation consists of an SP800-90A compliant DRBG that is fed by an SP800-90B compliant seed, which is generated from an entropy source. Each TRNG request generates a 128-bit random number.

The TRNG is initially seeded by calling the APIs to initialise the security engine:

- Protected Mode: `R_RSIP_Open()`
- Compatibility Mode: `mbedtls_platform_setup()`

Periodic reseeding of the TRNG is typically recommended for most applications that utilise a TRNG. Reseeding the TRNG can be performed as follows:

The reseeding interval for Protected Mode must be manually implemented by the application code. The application code must call `R_RSIP_Close()` followed by `R_RSIP_Open()` to reseed the TRNG.

The reseeding interval for Compatibility Mode is configured by defining the macro `MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL` and setting it to the number of calls that can be made to `psa_generate_random()` before reseeding is required. The macro can be defined and set using either the e2 studio IDE or the RA Smart Configurator (*MbedTLS (Crypto Only) module > RNG*). Reseeding will occur automatically if needed when `psa_generate_random()` is called.

7. Immutable Memory

The code flash blocks of the MCU can be configured to be immutable. This property is commonly used to protect critical assets, including those that define the identity of the device and control access to the device through a secure firmware update mechanism. Refer to the [RA4L1 User Manual] for the sizes and addresses of the MCU's code flash blocks.

An application that intends to be configured with immutable flash blocks can be prototyped by using the Block Protect Setting Register (BPS) and the Bank Select Register Secure (BPS_SEC) to temporarily configure the blocks as read-only. These settings can be modified using either self-programming or issuing the "Initialize" boot firmware command.

Production programming of the end-product should also use the equivalent bits in the Permanent Block Protect Setting Register (PBPS) and the Permanent Block Protect Setting Register Secure (PBPS_SEC) to make these blocks permanently immutable. Any programming of the PBPS or PBPS_SEC bits from 1 to 0 is permanent, and the chip can no longer be erased using the "Initialize" boot firmware command.

The code flash blocks that contain the Root of Trust should be made immutable. The immutable Root of Trust contains items such as a secure boot solution and root keys and certificates.

The Protection Programming Flag (FSPR) bit is used to prevent modification of the startup area selection and to disallow the "Chip Erase" command. Any programming of the FSPR bit from 1 to 0 is permanent, and the chip can no longer be erased using the "Initialize" boot firmware command.

For more details, refer to the following documents:

- [RA4L1 User Manual]
- [FSP User Manual]

8. Tamper Protection

8.1 Passive Tamper Detection

Passive tamper detection is provided by the Realtime Clock (RTC) peripheral of the MCU. The RTC can be configured such that a change on one of the input capture pins RTCICn triggers a capture of the current RTC value (i.e. the current time) and an optional interrupt. The captured value is retained after reset.

Refer to the detailed description of this peripheral and its associated electrical characteristics as stated in the [RA4L1 User Manual] for the requirements and limitations of this hardware feature.

[Figure 10. Passive Tamper Detect](#) shows the passive tamper components included in the RTC.




Figure 10. Passive Tamper Detect

Use of the passive tamper detection feature is application specific and dependent on the end-product's threat model. A typical use of passive tamper detection is to detect enclosure breaches that give an attacker physical access to a sensitive area of the end-product.

It is recommended to place the code that interacts with this peripheral in the Secure region if the application utilises TrustZone.

For more details, refer to the following documents:

- [RA4L1 User Manual]
- [FSP User Manual]

8.2 RSIP-E11A Protection Features

RSIP-E11A includes protection features that are designed to protect key materials from physical and logical attacks.




Figure 11. RSIP-E11A Block Diagram

As shown in [Figure 11. RSIP-E11A Block Diagram](#), access to the internal components of the security engine is protected by the Access Management Circuit. The software driver provided in the FSP must be used to perform the various cryptographic functions supported by RSIP-E11A. This driver performs the proper authenticated access sequence to interface with the RSIP-E11A's Access Management Circuit. Improper access attempts via the CPU or the debugger will result in the Access Management Circuit generating an interrupt (RSIP_TADI) and locking the security engine so it can no longer be used to perform cryptographic functions. A device reset is required to clear the error.

The application should use the e² studio IDE or the RA Smart Configurator to enable the RSIP_TADI interrupt event and call an application-defined ISR. The RSIP signal will be armed during the RSIP initialisation process. The interrupt should be enabled immediately after RSIP initialisation and disabled prior to RSIP shutdown. It is important to note that repeating the initialisation process will trigger the interrupt, even if the shutdown process is performed. To prevent any issues, clear the interrupt status prior to enabling the interrupt; otherwise, the interrupt will trigger when RSIP is initialised a second time.

It is recommended to place the code that interacts with this peripheral in the Secure region if the application utilises TrustZone.

The following sections provide more details about the additional hardware protection features that are available for each operational mode of the security engine. For more details, refer to the following documents:

- [RA4L1 User Manual]
- [FSP User Manual]
- [RSIP Modes]
- Section [3.3 RSIP-E11A](#)
- Section [4 RSIP-E11A Secure Key Injection, Storage, and Usage](#)
- Section [5 RSIP-E11A Cryptographic Functions](#)

8.2.1 RSIP-E11A Protected Mode Protection Features

Protected Mode provides timing attack protection on symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms, implementing constant time algorithms when dealing with key material. Protected Mode also provides SPA/DPA protections on AES operations.

In Protected Mode, all keys, both public and private, must be securely injected such that they have an associated MAC that binds them to the specific MCU chip. When performing cryptographic operations with either a public or a private key, the MAC associated with the key is checked prior to performing any cryptographic operation with that key. If the MAC verification fails, an error is returned.

8.2.2 RSIP-E11A Compatibility Mode Protection Features

Compatibility Mode provides timing attack protection on symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms, implementing constant time algorithms when dealing with key material.

SPA/DPA protections are not provided for AES operations. This security risk must be analysed and accepted when considering Compatibility Mode.

When performing cryptographic operations with a wrapped private key, the MAC associated with the key is checked prior to performing any cryptographic operation with that key. If the MAC verification fails, an error is returned.

Public keys in Compatibility Mode have no MAC. The security risk of using non-authenticated public keys must be analysed and accepted when considering Compatibility Mode.

8.3 Operational Temperature Monitoring

Some attacks involve operating the MCU outside its specified temperature range to try to induce erroneous behaviour. The on-chip Temperature Sensor (TSN) peripheral can be used to monitor the die temperature.

Refer to the detailed description of this peripheral and its associated electrical characteristics as stated in the [RA4L1 User Manual] for the requirements and limitations of this hardware feature.

Application code must periodically check the die temperature, compare it to the device's operating range, and trigger a fault if the temperature is out of range.

If temperature attacks are in scope for the application's threat model, this check should be performed at a rate that is consistent with the threat model of the application.

It is recommended to place the code that interacts with this peripheral in the Secure region if the application utilises TrustZone.

For more details, refer to the following documents:

- [RA4L1 User Manual]
- [FSP User Manual]

8.4 Operational Voltage Monitoring

Some attacks involve operating the MCU outside its specified voltage range to try to induce erroneous behaviour. The Low Voltage Detection (LVD) peripheral can be used to monitor the voltage level input to the VCC and EXLVD pins and alert if a selectable voltage threshold is crossed.

Refer to the detailed description of this peripheral and its associated electrical characteristics as stated in the [RA4L1 User Manual] for the requirements and limitations of this hardware feature.

There are three programmable voltage monitors on the MCU.

Voltage Monitor 0 can be configured to be active immediate upon reset using the voltage level selected in the Option-Setting Memory, resetting the MCU if the voltage drops below the selected value. Option Function Select Register 1 can be set to be in the Secure region to effectively place Voltage Monitor 0 in the Secure region.

It is recommended to configure Voltage Monitor 0 to be active immediately upon reset at a level that is appropriate for the application, and to configure Option Function Select Register 1 to be in the Secure region to mitigate against voltage fault injection attacks.

Voltage Monitor 1 and Voltage Monitor 2 can be configured for more advanced voltage detection scenarios.

It is recommended to place the code that interacts with the LVDs in the Secure region if the application utilises TrustZone.

For more details, refer to the following documents:

- [RA4L1 User Manual]
- [FSP User Manual]

8.5 Clock Protection

Some attacks involve varying the frequency of the MCU clock to try to induce erroneous behaviour. The Clock Frequency Accuracy Measurement Circuit (CAC) peripheral counts pulses of the measurement target clock using a measurement reference clock. If the number of pulses is not within an allowable range, an interrupt is generated.

Refer to the detailed description of this peripheral and its associated electrical characteristics as stated in the [RA4L1 User Manual] for the requirements and limitations of this hardware feature.

If the application uses an external clock and clock attacks are in scope for the application's threat model, the application should utilise the CAC.

It is recommended to place the code that interacts with this peripheral in the Secure region if the application utilises TrustZone.

For more details, refer to the following documents:

- [RA4L1 User Manual]
- [FSP User Manual]

9. Internet Connectivity

The RA4L1 MCU Group does not include any hardware to facilitate internet connectivity. If the end product includes additional hardware that provides internet connectivity, security best practices to support that connectivity in conjunction with the additional hardware should be implemented.

10. Secure Boot

To ensure the secure initialisation of the application, it is recommended to utilise and potentially customise the secure bootloader solution provided in the FSP.

10.1 Second Stage Bootloader

The RA4L1 does not have a built-in (i.e., First Stage) secure bootloader; however, it is possible to implement an immutable bootloader using the secure bootloader solution provided in the FSP.

The FSP includes a port of the TrustedFirmware MCUboot project, an open-source secure boot and firmware update solution for 32-bit microcontrollers. Secure boot is usually very application-specific; therefore, Renesas provides multiple examples of how the secure boot solution can be used. Note that secure boot and secure firmware updates are provided as a unified solution.

Review the threat model and start-up time requirements of the application when implementing secure boot. Since all code flash on the RA4L1 is stored inside the chip, and the programmer and debugger interface

should be locked upon deployment, it may be sufficient to implement only the secure firmware update portion of the secure bootloader solution.

For more details, refer to the following documents:

- [Bootloader Basic]
- [Bootloader Dual Bank]
- [Bootloader Encrypted]

11. Secure Firmware Update

The ability to update firmware in an end-product is becoming a standard requirement, especially if the product is connected to public infrastructure such as the internet. Any firmware update, whether through public infrastructure or a private connection, should be performed in a secure manner.

The FSP includes a port of the TrustedFirmware MCUboot project, an open-source secure boot and firmware update solution for 32-bit microcontrollers. Secure firmware update is usually very application-specific; therefore, Renesas provides multiple examples of how the secure firmware update solution can be used. Note that secure boot and secure firmware updates are provided as a unified solution.

There are many items to consider when devising a secure firmware update strategy, including:

How will the new image be received? Is it received over a secure channel, or does the image need to be encrypted for transfer to the product? A TLS connection can usually be considered a secure channel.

The authenticity of the image needs to be verified before it is programmed for execution. Therefore, the entire image must be received and stored locally. Will the new image be stored on-chip or in an external memory?

If the new image is stored externally prior to installation, does it need to be encrypted so an attacker cannot physically extract the plaintext binary?

Be sure to consider the threat model for the end product when architecting a firmware update strategy.

For more details, refer to the following documents:

- [Bootloader Basic]
- [Bootloader Dual Bank]
- [Bootloader Encrypted]

12. Provisioning

12.1 Device Lifecycle Management and Debug Authentication

The RA4L1 supports authenticated Device Lifecycle Management (DLM) and debug authentication to provide IP protection and support product failure analysis. [Figure 12.Device Lifecycle Management Overview](#) shows an overview.




Figure 12. Device Lifecycle Management Overview

MCUs are delivered in the Secure System Debug (SSD) state. In this state, the product developer has complete access to all user-accessible memory and peripherals. If the application does not utilise TrustZone as an isolation mechanism, the entire application is developed in this DLM state. If the application does utilise TrustZone, the Secure region application code is programmed and debugged in this state.

If the application utilises TrustZone, the MCU should be transitioned to the Non-secure System Debug (NSECSD) state to program and debug the Non-secure region application code.

When the MCU is programmed for incorporation in an end-product, there are several available options:

- If there is no desire to either re-enable the debugging capability of the MCU or maintain the ability to send the MCU to Renesas for failure analysis in the event of possible MCU failure, then the MCU should be transitioned to either Lock Debug (LCK_DBG) or Lock Factory Boot (LCK_BOOT). These transitions are permanent.
- To maintain the ability to send the MCU to Renesas for failure analysis in the event of possible MCU failure, an RMA_KEY must be injected when the device is in the SSD state. The MCU must be transitioned to the Deployed (DPL) state.
- To maintain the ability to re-enable debugging of the Non-secure region, then a NSECDBG_KEY must be injected when the device is in the NSECSD state.
- To maintain the ability to re-enable debugging of the Secure region, including re-enabling debugging of an application that does not utilise TrustZone as an isolation mechanism, then an NSECDBG_KEY must be injected when the device is in the NSECSD state, and a SECDBG_KEY must be injected when the device is in the SSD state.

Key preparation steps where mass production keys are exposed in plaintext must be performed in a secure environment. Test keys used for prototype development can be created and prepared on a development PC.

The process of preparing and injecting DLM keys is similar to the secure key injection process for Protected Mode, described in section [4.3 Secure and Plaintext Key Injection and Update](#).

The most secure configuration is LCK_BOOT; however, the application use case may require the ability to re-enable programming and/or debugging of the end product. In this case, non-trivial keys that are not duplicated from Renesas examples or other publicly available cryptography references must be used.

Renesas provides the following tools to support this process:

- Security Key Management Tool (SKMT), available here: <https://www.renesas.com/software-tool/security-key-management-tool>. This tool can create sample keys and prepare the DLM keys for secure injection.
- Renesas Flash Programmer (RFP), available here: <https://www.renesas.com/software-tool/renesas-flash-programmer-programming-gui>. This tool can perform DLM state transition using the MCU's factory boot firmware.

Select third-party programming tools that also support secure key injection.

For more details, refer to the following documents and sections of this document:

- [RA4L1 User Manual]
- [DLM]
- Section [4.3 Secure and Plaintext Key Injection and Update](#)

12.2 Secure Factory Programming

The RA4L1 supports Secure Factory Programming (SFP), enabling secure production programming of the MCU in a non-secure environment.

It is not required to use Secure Factory Programming to create a secure end-product. However, Secure Factory Programming can be used as a component of a secure supply chain solution when production programming is performed in either a secure or non-secure environment.

[Figure 13. Secure Factory Programming Overview](#) shows an overview of the secure programming process. The developer must create an Image Encryption Key. This key must be used to encrypt the firmware image. The Image Encryption Key must be wrapped by a UFPK.

Key preparation steps where keys are exposed in plaintext must be performed in a secure environment.

At the completion of the SFP process, the MCU can be either completely locked or left in a DLM state that allows authenticated regression. If DLM keys are being provisioned, they must be wrapped with the same UFPK that was used to wrap the Image Encryption Key.

If authenticated DLM state regression will be allowed, it is recommended to also disable the Initialize command during production programming.

The W-UFPK, the wrapped DLM key(s), the wrapped Image Encryption Key, and the encrypted firmware image are provided to the production programming facility. These items are then used in conjunction with the MCU's factory boot firmware to securely program the MCU.

Non-trivial keys that are not duplicated from Renesas examples or other publicly available cryptography references must be used for the UFPK, the Image Encryption Key, and any DLM keys.




Figure 13. Secure Factory Programming Overview

Secure Factory Programming can be combined with RSIP-E11A Protected Mode secure key injection for provisioning and personalisation.

Secure Factory Programming has a limitation that application keys cannot be made immutable via the Permanent Block Protect Setting registers. If securely injected RSIP-E11A Protected Mode keys need to be made immutable, the application code must set the Permanent Block Protect Setting registers when it executes the first time.

Renesas provides the following tools to support this process:

- Security Key Management Tool (SKMT), available here: <https://www.renesas.com/software-tool/security-key-management-tool>. This tool can create sample keys and prepare the firmware image for secure factory programming.
- Renesas Flash Programmer (RFP), available here: <https://www.renesas.com/software-tool/renesas-flash-programmer-programming-gui>. This tool can perform Secure Factory Programming using the MCU's factory boot firmware.

Select third-party programming tools that also support secure key injection.

For more details, refer to the following documents and sections of this document:

- [RA4L1 User Manual]
- [Boot Firmware]
- [Secure Factory Programming]
- Section [4 RSIP-E11A Secure Key Injection, Storage, and Usage](#)
- Section [12.1 Device Lifecycle Management and Debug Authentication](#)

13. Website and Support

Visit the following URLs to learn about key elements of the RA family, download components and related documentation, and get support:

RA Product Information	renesas.com/ra
RA4L1 Product Information	renesas.com/ra4l1
RA Product Support Forum	renesas.com/ra/forum
RA Flexible Software Package	renesas.com/FSP
Renesas Support	renesas.com/support
Renesas PSIRT	renesas.com/psirt

Revision History

Rev.	Date	Description	
		Page	Summary
1.00	Jan.24.25	—	Initial release

General Precautions in the Handling of Microprocessing Unit and Microcontroller Unit Products

The following usage notes are applicable to all Microprocessing unit and Microcontroller unit products from Renesas. For detailed usage notes on the products covered by this document, refer to the relevant sections of the document as well as any technical updates that have been issued for the products.

1. Precaution against Electrostatic Discharge (ESD)

A strong electrical field, when exposed to a CMOS device, can cause destruction of the gate oxide and ultimately degrade the device operation. Steps must be taken to stop the generation of static electricity as much as possible, and quickly dissipate it when it occurs. Environmental control must be adequate. When it is dry, a humidifier should be used. This is recommended to avoid using insulators that can easily build up static electricity.

Semiconductor devices must be stored and transported in an anti-static container, static shielding bag or conductive material. All test and measurement tools including work benches and floors must be grounded. The operator must also be grounded using a wrist strap. Semiconductor devices must not be touched with bare hands. Similar precautions must be taken for printed circuit boards with mounted semiconductor devices.

2. Processing at power-on

The state of the product is undefined at the time when power is supplied. The states of internal circuits in the LSI are indeterminate and the states of register settings and pins are undefined at the time when power is supplied. In a finished product where the reset signal is applied to the external reset pin, the states of pins are not guaranteed from the time when power is supplied until the reset process is completed. In a similar way, the states of pins in a product that is reset by an on-chip power-on reset function are not guaranteed from the time when power is supplied until the power reaches the level at which resetting is specified.

3. Input of signal during power-off state

Do not input signals or an I/O pull-up power supply while the device is powered off. The current injection that results from input of such a signal or I/O pull-up power supply may cause malfunction and the abnormal current that passes in the device at this time may cause degradation of internal elements. Follow the guideline for input signal during power-off state as described in your product documentation.

4. Handling of unused pins

Handle unused pins in accordance with the directions given under handling of unused pins in the manual. The input pins of CMOS products are generally in the high-impedance state. In operation with an unused pin in the open-circuit state, extra electromagnetic noise is induced in the vicinity of the LSI, an associated shoot-through current flows internally, and malfunctions occur due to the false recognition of the pin state as an input signal become possible.

5. Clock signals

After applying a reset, only release the reset line after the operating clock signal becomes stable. When switching the clock signal during program execution, wait until the target clock signal is stabilized. When the clock signal is generated with an external resonator or from an external oscillator during a reset, ensure that the reset line is only released after full stabilization of the clock signal. Additionally, when switching to a clock signal produced with an external resonator or by an external oscillator while program execution is in progress, wait until the target clock signal is stable.

6. Voltage application waveform at input pin

Waveform distortion due to input noise or a reflected wave may cause malfunction. If the input of the CMOS device stays in the area between V_{IL} (Max.) and V_{IH} (Min.) due to noise, for example, the device may malfunction. Take care to prevent chattering noise from entering the device when the input level is fixed, and also in the transition period when the input level passes through the area between V_{IL} (Max.) and V_{IH} (Min.).

7. Prohibition of access to reserved addresses

Access to reserved addresses is prohibited. The reserved addresses are provided for possible future expansion of functions. Do not access these addresses as the correct operation of the LSI is not guaranteed.

8. Differences between products

Before changing from one product to another, for example to a product with a different part number, confirm that the change will not lead to problems. The characteristics of a microprocessing unit or microcontroller unit products in the same group but having a different part number might differ in terms of internal memory capacity, layout pattern, and other factors, which can affect the ranges of electrical characteristics, such as characteristic values, operating margins, immunity to noise, and amount of radiated noise. When changing to a product with a different part number, implement a system-evaluation test for the given product.

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Corporate Headquarters

TOYOSU FORESIA, 3-2-24 Toyosu,
Koto-ku, Tokyo 135-0061, Japan

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